LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES by ZHANG, HANNING
University of Georgia School of Law 
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
LLM Theses and Essays Student Works and Organizations 
2000 
LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
HANNING ZHANG 
University of Georgia School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the Transnational Law 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
ZHANG, HANNING, "LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES" (2000). 
LLM Theses and Essays. 260. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/260 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works and Organizations at Digital 
Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses and Essays by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more 
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu. 
&he 9/ftu>€r$i&/ of Georgia
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA LAW LIBRARY
3 8425 00347 3928
The University of Georgi;
Alexander Campbell King Law Librai
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/lawsgoverningbanOOzhan
LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
by
HANNING ZHANG
LL.B., Peking University, China, 1996
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF LAWS
ATHENS, GEORGIA
2000
LAW LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY CF GEORGIA
©2000
Hanning Zhang
All Rights Reserved
LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
by
Approved:
HANNING ZHANG
Approved:
^)L^A Date Sbsho*S
Major Professor
M^)^4^l^ Date <1<I
Chairman, Reading Committee
(S^U^ I Mid
Graduate Dean
Date
JvkU l
t
lOQQ
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I want to thank professor Fredrick W. Huszagh for helping me in my preparation of
my thesis. His comments and suggestions broadened my perspective and gave me new
insights into the depth of my field. It would have been impossible for me to accomplish
this thesis without his help.
I also want to express my gratitude to professor Gabriel M. Wilner. As the chairman
of the reading committee for my thesis, his encouraging attitude towards my research and
writing was especially helpful. Without his encouragement I would not have been able to
pursue my studies with success.
Special thanks also to professor Wu Zhipan and professor Li Ming for supporting
my application for the LL.M. program of the University of Georgia.
I am also grateful to my parents, Zhang Guoan and Guo Zhengjian, and my
husband, Mingqiang Qian, for their continued support and encouragement during my
application for the LL.M. program and my studies at the University of Georgia.
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. PREVIOUS STATUTORY REGIME ON BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES. ..5
A. General Restrictions on Bank Investment Activities under the Glass-Steagall
Act and Bank Holding Company Act 5
B. Liberalization of banking regulation in the European Community 8
C. Summary of Differences of U.S. and E.U. laws 12
III. THE EFFECTS OF LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES
ACTIVITIES 14
A. The Rationale basis for imposing a separation between securities and
commercial banking activities and defects of this rationale 14
B. Competitiveness and Efficiency 17
C. Reciprocity concerns 22
IV. EXPANDED BANKING POWERS 26
A. Expanded banking powers by Financial Agency Interpretations and Judicial
Precedence 27
B. OCC's New Operating Subsidiary Rule 32
C. The Fed's New Operating Standards on Section 20 Subsidiaries 35
D. Acquisitions of Investment Banks by Bank Holding Companies 36
VI
V. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORM 41
A. History of Recent Legislative Reform 41
B. Summary of Expanded Powers of Banks in the New Legislation
(S.900/H.R.10) 45
C. Functional Regulation 49
VI. APPROPRIATE REGULATORY REGIME FOR MODERN BUSINESS OF
BANKING 53
A. Corporate Structure 53
B. Functional Regulatory Model 57
C. Consumer Protection 61
D. International Regulatory Issues 63
VII. CONCLUSION 67
BIBLIOGRAPHY 70
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The financial services industry has experienced significant transformations, both
internationally and domestically. As part of the financial industry, the banking business
has expanded rapidly, due to technology innovations, financial product diversification,
and economic development. The rapid development of new financial products and the
complexity of financial markets make it impossible to clearly distinguish traditional
banking business from investment banking activities. Moreover, during the last several
decades, international banking activities have increased substantially. 1 International trade
and the availability of technology make possible and necessary to diversify banks'
financial businesses, including securities business. As a result, bank securities activities
in both domestic and international markets have become an important part of banking
activity diversification.
To prevent excessive risks associated with nonbank activities from impairing
safety and soundness of banking system, the previous regulatory regime in the United
States limited the banking business to deposit taking and commercial lending. The
separation of traditional banking from the investment banking business has, to some
degree, helped the United States financial system survive the economic depression in
1930s. However, the economic landscape has changed substantially since the great
depression. As a result, the depression-era regulations have become outmoded, since the
separation of commercial banking from investment banking has impaired the ability of
U.S. banking organizations to survive in the new financial environment and meet the
expanded demands of customers. Accordingly, there have been strenuous efforts to repeal
See Edward L. Symons, The United States Banking System, 19 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1, 1 (1993).
the Glass-Steagall Act, which put too many activity restrictions on commercial banks.
Compared to U.S. banking regulations, the regulatory regime in the European Union is
more liberal, especially after the implementation of the Second Banking Directive, which
allows E.U. credit institutions to engage in both traditional banking and investment
banking businesses, and even some non-financial industries.
In order to effectively compete with non-banking institutions and foreign banks,
who have successfully invaded in traditional banking markets, U.S. banks and bank
holding companies have made strenuous efforts to enter into the securities business.
However, these endeavors were far from smooth and effortless, because of previous
stringent restrictions. It was not until the Financial Service Act of 1999 was signed into
law that U.S. banking organizations are finally free to provide a full range of financial
services, which are compatible to what European Union's universal banks have provided.
Deregulation has become an inevitable trend in the modernization of the financial
industry. With the growing importance of securities and investment activities to banking
organizations, it is increasingly important to develop appropriate regulatory framework
for the financial industry. Although the tendency of liberalization and deregulation in the
financial industry will enhance the efficiency, profitability, and competitiveness of
international banks, there is still a need for meaningful legislation to protect the safety
and soundness of the modernized financial system.
This thesis analyzes the previous regulatory approach to bank investment
activities in the United States and its effects on banking industry, discusses regulatory
changes that expanded banking powers, reviews the new legislation and potential
problems in the current movement of financial reform, and suggests some solutions.
Chapter II reviews previous statutory regimes on bank securities activities,
including those separating traditional and investment banking under Glass-Steagall Act
and Bank Holding Company Act. The regulatory regime under E.U. banking system is
addressed to give an example of successful deregulation, by which universal banks may
fully enjoy the rapid changing domestic and international financial markets.
Chapter III analyzes the effects of laws governing bank securities activities. This
part expresses concerns that laws separating traditional banking and securities activities
have affected the competitiveness and effectiveness of commercial banks in the United
States and international financial markets. These effects have largely prompted financial
services reform in the United States.
Chapter IV examines the well-known trend of commercial bank entering into the
securities business. To some degree, banks have successfully expanded their powers in
the investment banking areas through financial agency interpretations and court
jurisprudence. This part also addresses the trend of investment bank acquisitions by bank
holding companies, which would become important incentives for Congress to pass
financial reform bills.
Chapter V gives an overview of recent legislative reform on financial services,
including extensive modification of the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company
Act, designed to allow banking organizations to conduct a wide range of financial
services. Financial services reform has made a successful march toward financial
modernization in the United States.
Chapter VI addresses some comments on remaining problems associated with
current of financial services reform in the United States. These potential problems include
holding company structure, functional regulation, and consumer protection issues. This
part also addresses the issue of international supervisory convergence, which is
considered critical in crafting the appropriate regulatory regime for the expanded and
diversified international banking.
Chapter VII concludes that because of the growing complexity and interrelation of
the American financial system, meaningful legislation should be carefully designed.
While the new law has liberalized activities of banks and bank holding companies,
regulators have to pay attention to the safety and soundness of financial system. This part
also serves to further underscore the convergence of international supervisions, which are
significantly important to ensure the safe and sound financial system.
CHAPTER II
PREVIOUS STATUTORY REGIME ON BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
A. General Restrictions on Bank Investment Activities under the Glass-Steagall Act
and Bank Holding Company Act
Generally, the Glass-Steagall Act, part of the Banking Act of 1933, prohibited
U.S. commercial banks, with certain exceptions, from directly underwriting secunties.
There was a widespread concern that commercial banks' and their affiliates' substantial
involvement in securities activities was responsible for the Great Depression, 3 which was
marked by the 1929 stock market collapse and the subsequent banking crisis of the early
1930s. The Glass-Stealgall Act attempted to separate commercial banking and investment
banking, so as to reduce the potential risks associated with the overlap between the two
usinesses.
4
The Glass-Steagall Act established limitations on bank securities activities,
such as purchasing and selling securities for their customers, and underwriting, selling,
and dealing in specified securities by their own accounts. 5 Bank affiliates were prohibited
from engaging principally in securities activities. 6 The Act also prohibited securities
firms from engaging in commercial banking business, such as taking deposits.
Furthermore, it required that individuals involved in any aspect of investment banking
o
business not serve as officers, directors or employees in commercial banks.
2
See 12 U.S.C. §§24, 377, 378(a), 78 (1994).
3 JONNATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 495
(2ed. 1997).
4
Id. at 496.
5
12 U.S.C. §335(1994).
6
Id. § 377.
7
Id. §378(a)(l).
8
Id. §78.
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited national banks that are FD1C
insurance members from buying securities for their own account. 9 Federal- or state-
chartered banks were expressly proscribed from underwriting and dealing in securities.
Section 20 prohibited national banks, state Federal Reserve member banks and their
subsidiaries from affiliating with any entity engaged principally in investment banking
businesses, such as "issuing, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at
wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,
or other securities."
10
Subject to Section 16 exceptions that allow commercial banks to be
involved in selected securities activities, an institution was prohibited by Section 21 from
engaging in issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities if it received
deposits."
Section 32 precluded management interlocking and directorial overlap between
Federal Reserve member banks and institutions engaged principally in the securities
business.
1
" Officers, directors, and employees in investment banking institutions are
prohibited from being staffs of commercial banks at the same time. 13 This restriction also
applied to banking and investment entities that have no affiliated relationship. 14
In order to strengthen the limitations and restrictions on securities activities of
commercial banks under the Glass-Steagall Act, U.S. Congress enacted the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956. 15 As a general rule under the Bank Holding Company Act, bank
holding companies were prohibited from acquiring or retaining direct ownership or
control of any voting shares of any company that is not a bank. 16 The general purpose of
Bank Holding Company Act was to protect depository institutions from risks associated
9
Id. §24 (Seventh).
10
Id. §377.
11
Id. §378.
12
Id. §78.
13
Id.
"Id.
See Joseph J. Northern & Christopher D. Lolive, The Ongoing Process ofInternational Bank Regulatory
and Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership", 16 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 227 (1997).
with nonbanking businesses in other affiliates of bank holding companies, thus ensuring
the safety and soundness of banking system.
The barriers created by the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act
between commercial and investment banking were not impenetrable. Exceptions of the
Glass-Steagall Act did allow national banks to buy and sell securities purely upon the
order of and for the accounts of customers. 17 In this situation, banks act as fiduciaries of
their clients. National banks can purchase and sell government securities, securities of the
bank itself and securities of other national banks.
Bank Holding Companies generally have a broader range of powers. Regulation
Y of the Federal Reserve Board provides a list of permissible non-banking activities that
can be engaged in by bank holding companies, because these activities are closely related
to banking.
1
If a bank holding company wants to engage in an activity that is not listed in
Regulation Y, it can seek permission from the Federal Reserve Board to allow it to
conduct this new activity. 20 The Federal Reserve Board has added a broad range of
permissible activities to the list from time to time according to applications of bank
holding companies to expand the scope of their businesses. Through its "closely related
to banking" interpretations, the Federal Reserve Board has allowed bank holding
7 1
companies to engage in a rather extensive array of securities activities. In addition, the
Courts tend to support Federal Reserve Board's interpretations that greatly expand
banking powers injudicial review.
Bank holding companies that have subsidiaries or affiliates operating in foreign
countries could enjoy more liberal regulations. Under the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation K, bank holding companies may engage in underwriting, distributing and
16 12U.S.C. §1843(a) (1994).
17
Id. §24.
18
Id. §24.
19
Id.§ 1843(c).
20 MACEY & MILLER, supra note 3, at 356.
21
See Symons, supra note 1, at 22 (1993).
8dealing in debt and equity securities subject to less stringent restrictions when they are
doing business outside the United States. 22
B. Liberalization of banking regulation in the European Union
Compared to previously stringent restrictions on bank securities activities in the
United States, related regulations in the European Union are much more liberal. The
major policy difference between the United States and the European Union is that the
United States has more concern for the safety and soundness of the financial system,
while the European Union pays more attention to harmonization and integration of
financial markets in European countries. Accordingly, when the United States maintained
an extensive system of stringent banking regulations, the European Union has advocated
the most liberal financial system in the world. Liberalization of the regulatory system in
the European Union reflected the trend of globalization and deregulation of financial
services in the world. In the significantly deregulated framework, E.U. universal banks
can provide a full range of financial services, thus significantly improve their competitive
ability in the international markets. This has become one of the incentives that pushed the
United States to reform its previous banking regulations. An overview of the liberalized
financial system is necessary to understand the trend of globalization and deregulation of
banking businesses.
Among the four basic freedoms through which European Union intends to achieve
harmonization and integration in its internal market, "free movement of capital is a vital
accessory to the other three basic freedoms,"23 which are free movements of goods,
persons, and services. 24 The liberalization of financial services is an important strategy to
achieve E.U. financial integration, characterized by a single community banking
22 12C.F.R. §21 1.5(d) (1994).
23
See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 606 (1993).
24
Id.
market.
25 Under the single market approach, credit institutions may "establish branches or
subsidiaries and provide the whole range of their services throughout the Community
without the need for establishment in every Member State". 6 The Treaty of Rome
provides the legal basis for the single banking market to insure the rights to provide
financial services.
27 The meaning of free movement of capital should include the freedom
to provide financial services, because practically, "the freedom to provide banking
services exists only in those Member State that have fully liberalized capital
movements"."
Since 1962, European Union has endeavored to achieve the liberalization of
capital movements, which is one of the most difficult tasks." In 1977 the Council
adopted the First Banking Directive, which "allowed banks based anywhere in the EC to
establish branches or subsidiaries in any other member country on the condition that
banking regulations in the host country were fully observed". The First Banking
Directive is one of the early steps taken by the EC to liberalize banking activities. 31 In
June, 1988, the Council of Ministers of the EC authorized full liberalization of capital
transactions, including short-term capital movements.
32
It was intended to implement the
full liberalization of capital movements by the end of July 1990. 33
The Second Banking Directive, which was adopted in December 1989, requires
member states to integrate it into their national legislation. 34 By January 1993, it became
the crucial law in European banking regulation. The major purpose of the Second
See George S. Zavvos, Banking Integration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 3 1 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 463,464-65(1990).
26
Id. at 465.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 465, n. 12.
29 Mat 465.
30 ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
121 (1994).
31
Id.
32
See generally, Council Directive 88/361/EC.
33 See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra not 30, at 120.
34
See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC.
35
See Wendy Fowler, EC Regulation ofthe Banking Sector, 5 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 405, 410 (1993).
10
Banking Directive is to achieve essential harmonization in banking regulation within the
E.U. and to ensure the free movement of capital. 36 In the single license system designed
under the Second Banking Directive, credit institutions may open their branches in other
member states without host state authorization. The ultimate objective of the European
Union is to achieve monetary integration in the European Union.
Although the Second Banking Directive creates considerable profits for both E.U.
credit institutions and non-E.U. banks, the degrees to which non-E.U. banks can benefit
from the single license system are somewhat different. A non-E.U. bank can not be
considered as a credit institution under the meaning of the Second Banking directive, if it
only has a presence in a Member State without authorization by that state. Therefore,
this mere branch of this non-E.U. bank can not operate throughout European Union
without host state authorization.
40
In order to fully enjoy the benefit from the single
license system, this non-E.U. bank must establish or acquire a subsidiary that is licensed
to operate as a credit institution by a member state. 41 Once the non-E.U. bank has a
subsidiary which is authorized by a Member State, the bank may operating its offices
anywhere in the European Union without going through any other licensing process.
Credit institutions subjected to the Second Banking Directive can conduct a full
range of financial activities including traditional financial activities and various securities
activities, such as underwriting securities.
42 Under Annex 1 of the Second Banking
Directive, a credit institution can trade for its own account or for account of its customers
in "(a) money market instruments; (b) foreign exchange; (c) financial futures and options;
See generally, Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC.
37
Id. Art. 6.
See Craig M. Scheer, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance in the European Union:
Implicationsfor U.S. Banks, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l & Econ. 171, 176 (1994).
See Craig M. Scheer, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance in the European Union:
Implicationsfor U.S. Banks, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l & Econ. 171, 177 (1994).
40
Id. at 176.
41 Mat 177.
42
See generally, Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Annex.
11
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments; (e) transferable securities."
43 The Second
Banking Directive was intended to encourage establishment of the universal banking
model, within which traditional banking, investment banking, and even some commercial
and industrial businesses are combined in one institution.
According to the Second Banking Directive, "member states must permit within
their territories the transaction of activities listed in the Annex by a credit institution
authorized in another member state," if the credit institution's authorization covers such
activities.
45 Member states may impose stricter standards and limitations on the banks
registered within their territories. 6 However, for a credit institution who has its registered
office in its home state, the host state may not put such restrictions on activities of this
bank, if the home state allows such activities. 47 For example, German law permits
universal banks, which have their registered offices in Germany, to conduct practically all
of the financial activities listed in Second Banking Directive. When these German
universal banks intend to open their branches or subsidiaries in a Member State that
prohibits or limits universal banking, these German banks are not subject to the host state
prohibitions. Accordingly, German universal banks may have competitive advantages
over the host country's domestic banks. The host country then has the incentive to adjust
its banking regulations to be more consistent with the German law. This is the way that
the Second Banking Directive works to achieve the harmonization of financial
regulations among E.U. countries.
In E.U. countries, banking regulatory regimes on bank investment activities are
quite different. Generally, there are three broad types of regulatory systems: the universal
banking system, the hybrid system and the strict regulatory system. The universal
43 Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Annex §7.
See Zavvos, supra note 25, at 480.
45
See Fowler, supra note 35, at 412.
46
Id.
See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Art. 6.
48
See Zavvos, supra note 25, at 481.
12
banking model could be found in Germany, where "corporations with banking licenses
can not only take deposits and make loans, but also are permitted to underwrite and trade
securities, to operate mutual funds, to engage in investment counseling, and even to hold
large equity shares in commercial, industrial, and insurance companies if these activities
are kept within different departments of the bank".
49 The hybrid system can be found in
countries such as United Kingdom France and Greece. In this system, banks have a
broad range of powers, but they are subject to some statutory limitations on their
investment activities. For example, British banks tend to conduct non-bank activities,
such as securities activities, within separate legal entities. Within the restrictive
regulatory framework, such as Italian banking system, banks are subject to strict activity
restrictions.
52
In light of these different regulatory systems within EU countries,
achieving the goal of harmonization on banking regulation is far from effortless. There is
a need for member states to implement the Council Directives and cooperate in the
harmonization process.
C. Summary of differences of U.S. and E.U. laws
Because of the risky nature of underwriting securities, the importance of public
confidence in the banking system, and the special role of banks in national economy, U.S.
banking laws previously prohibited banks and bank holding companies from undertaking
securities brokerage activities, with some limited exemptions. In contrast, E.U.
directives permit credit institutions to engage in investment banking activities, such
securities underwriting, trading, investment advisory and brokerage services. The
different approaches to bank securities activities reflect the different premises upon which
49
Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking, 19 Brook. J. Int'l 203, 203 (1993).
30
See Zavvos, supra note 25, at 481
.
51
Macey, supra note 49. at 203.
2 See Uwe H. Schneider, The Harmonization ofEC Banking Laws: the Euro-Passport to Profitability and
International Competitiveness ofFinancial Institutions, 22 law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 261, 279 (1991).
See Frederic W. Gerkens, Opportunities for regulatoiy Arbitrage under the European Economic
Community 's Financial Services Directives and Related United States Regulations, 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l
& comp. L. 455, 464-465 (1996).
13
Community and United States laws are based. 54 The European Union has realized that
economic development and technology innovations substantially increase the competition
in the financial service marketplace. Furthermore, the traditional banking business has
been less profitable than the investment banking industry. Permitting banks to engage in
the securities industry protects the safety and soundness of the banking industry, because
by participating in the investment banking business, banks become more profitable, 55 and
thus enhance their competitive ability. In Europe, banks have had many years of
experience in distributing both domestic and international securities through their
branches or affiliates. 56 Unlike large securities firms in the United States, E.U. banks play
the major role in the investment banking industry in Europe, because non-bank securities
companies are not strong enough to "provide the capital necessary for a modern securities
market."
57
Accordingly, adoption of the universal banking model is more appropriate in
the European Union, considering the rapid expansion and fierce competition in the
international capital market. The development of universal banks will improve the
CO
competitive position of the European Union on the global marketplace.
The United States has now undertaken its own banking law reform, which will
greatly expand banking powers. This reform, heightened by the Financial Services Act of
1999, has embraced a certain degree of deregulation that is comparable to the
liberalization of financial system in the European Union. More detailed descriptions of
U.S. banking law reform are presented in Chapter V.
54
See Zavvos, supra note 25. at 481.
55
Id.
56
See SAMUEL L. HAYES III & PHILIP M. HUBBARD, INVESTMENT BANKING: A TALE OF
THREE CITIES 65 (1990).
57
See Zavvos, supra note 25, at 481.
58
Id.
CHAPTER III
THE EFFECTS OF LAWS GOVERNING BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
A. The Rationale basis for imposing a separation between securities and commercial
banking activities and the defects of this rationale
It was believed that the combination of traditional bank activities, such as keeping
deposits and providing credit to consumers, and non-bank activities, such as underwriting
securities, creates inherent conflicts of interest.
59
There were some arguments that too
many functions concentrated in a single financial institution would reduce its ability to
provide high quality services in some areas.60 According to these opinions, it is better to
encourage specialized institutions to provide particular types of services than
multifunctional institutions to offer all kinds of services.
61
It was believed that if banking
industry was not structured to avoid conflict of interest, public confidence in the banking
system would be undermined. 62
Because of the unique position of banks in the United States' economy, safe and
sound banking practices are highly important. Securities-related activities of commercial
banks were considered to be speculative, profit-seeking and risk-taking ventures which
would undermine the effectiveness of "safety and soundness" of banking practices. It was
believed that if banks combined traditional banking with corporate securities activities
such as underwriting, trading, investment advisory and brokerage services,
mismanagement and unacceptable risk-taking would happen. 6 Therefore, there was a
See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basisfor Continued
Separation of Comercial and Investment Banking, 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 647, 676 (1986).
60
See G. BROKER, COMPETITION IN BANKING 83 (1989).
61
Id.
See Lorenzo, supra note 59, at 676.
63
See BROKER, supra not 60, at 83.
14
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need for appropriate regulatory measures to separate commercial banking and investment
banking.
A basic reason for separating the investment and commercial banking activities
is inherent in basic functions of banks as depositories for savings, payments
intermediaries, and creditors. 65 Non-banking corporate activities, such as securities
underwriting, are not supportive of or consistent with these above-mentioned essential
banking services. 66 In addition, it was believed that bank securities activities would
undermine banks' ability to provide traditional banking services. 67
Although the major purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act was to protect banks' safety
and soundness, restore public confidence and avoid conflicts of interest in the commercial
banking business, the rationale basis itself contains defects that can not be overcome.
Empirical studies show that bank failures at that time were not caused by banks engaging
in the securities business, but were more related to: 1) the failure of the Federal Reserve
to maintain bank reserves and money supply, 2) the unit banking system, 3) and effects of
inappropriate or disruptive actions by the Congress and President Roosevelt. 69 In other
words, the banking crisis in the 1930s was ultimately due to "general economic
conditions exacerbated by tax increases, protectionist trade measures, and a restrictive
monetary policy."
70
Actually, it was "the erection of the federal deposit insurance system
and the regulatory reform contained in the Banking Act of 1933," not the Glass-Steagall
itself, that mainly affected the restoration of safety and soundness of banks. According
to some studies, banks which had affiliates in the securities business were more resistant
64
Id.
65
See Lorenzo, supra note 59, at 653-54.
66
Id. at 654.
67
Id.
68
See George J. Benston, The Origins of and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act, ANTHONY
SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING 45 (1996).
™Id.
'° William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future—Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 281,286(1988).
Edward D. Sullivan,
indurstry, 112 Banking L.J. 977, 982 (1995).
Glass-Steagall Update: Proposals to Modernize the Structure ofFinancial Services
16
7?
to failures during the 1930s banking crisis. As regards conflict of interest concerns,
there is no evidence to show that banks would abuse their powers against their clients. 73
Potential conflict of interest could exist in any business in which fiduciary relations are
involved, such as brokerage and insurance businesses. Traditional banking business also
contains such kind of conflicts.
Since banks are normally proficient investors, it is hard to imagine that banks tend
to make excessive speculation on imprudent stocks. "Unless a bank is trying to bankrupt
itself," there is no reason for it to engage in excessive risk-taking activities.
74
Banks have
many market incentives to restrict their investment activities, including commercial
lending and securities activities. 5 Since there is no reasonable explanation of why
investments in securities is inherently more risky than commercial banking activities,76
how the Glass-Steagall Act reduces the risks of banks to make imprudent investment
decisions is far from clear. 77 Actually, investing in some high-quality stocks, such as blue
chip stocks, is inherently far less risky than some commercial loans, such as real estate
investment trusts. 78 Subject to the Glass-Steagall restrictions, banks can not diversify
their portfolio of assets, and thus their activities are more risky. 79
Under "interest group" theory, investment banks have incentives to persuade
legislators to enact laws that prohibit commercial banks from investment banking
business, in order to reduce competitors and lessen competition. There is reason to
believe that the motivation of Congress in enacting Glass-Steagall was not purely to
72
See MACHEY & MILLER., supra not 3, at 507.
See George J. Benston, The Origins of and Justification for the Glass-Steagall Act, ANTHONY
SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING 59 (1996).
Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislative and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of
Glass-Steagall, 33 Emory L.J. 1,13 (1984).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 11.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
/</.atl3.
80
See Benston, SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 68, at 60.
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protect the public interest. Furthermore, some argue that the separation of commercial
and investment banking is not economically necessary, but an artificial regulation.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), an organization of central banks,
• X
1
conducted a study on financial services reform. According to the BIS study, "allowing
banks to enter the securities business would give them an additional opportunity to
diversify and create an alternative source of revenue," when companies tend to acquire
financing from investment banks. 82 The line between traditional banking and the
investment banking business has been blurred by the rapid changing technology
environment, 83 which was unpredicted when Congress issued the Glass-Steagall Act.
Moreover, customers tend to obtain the full range of financial services they need within
one institution, because of the convenience resulting from the interchangeable nature of
many financial products. 4
B. Competitiveness and Efficiency
Universal banking has become one of the inevitable tendencies of financial
modernization. One of the characteristics of universal banking is the expansion of
banking powers, including bank securities powers. Since "the demarcation lines
between the various financial sectors have become increasingly blurred", there is a need
for financial integration of the banking and securities businesses. Accordingly, legal
restrictions on bank involvement in securities activities have become antiquated and
should be removed from the current regulatory regime.
Study supports commercial banks to engage in securities activities, 17 NO. 15 Banking PoPy Rep. 2
(1998)
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The regulatory framework of E.U. banking law was designed for the universal
banking model, which combines both commercial banking and investment banking.
Banks, under a universal banking system, are able to conduct a broad range of investment
activities, including underwriting securities. 88 Therefore, E.U. banks could effectively
diversify their investment portfolios and thus obtain many profit opportunities both in
domestic and international markets. Subject to less restrictive regulations, universal banks
would have competitive advantages over other banks which bear heavy regulatory
burdens. The adoption of the Second Banking Directive by Member States would
increase competition among banks, and thus change market shares and push European
oq
banks to expand into international markets. During the financial integration process,
"the EC will become among the most competitive of the world's financial markets, with
large numbers of indigenous and foreign-based players clustered in distinct strategic
groups". The efficient and innovative E.U. financial markets could not only create
internal benefits for E.U. regional economy, but enhance the competitiveness of E.U.
banking in the global arena as well. 91
Before the implementation of the Financial Services Act of 1999, U.S. banks have
experienced a long-term erosion in their market shares of commercial and industrial loans
by other financial institutions such as investment banks and insurance companies. " As a
result of financial market development and technology innovations, U.S. banks have
faced and will continue to face fierce competition from domestic non-banking
organizations and international banks. 93 These financial institutions had considerable
competitive advantages over U.S. banking organizations, not because they had some
See Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Annex.
See Christopher T. Toll, The European Community 's Second Banking Directive: Can Antiquated United
States Legislation Keep Pace? 23 Vand. J. Transnat'l 615, 643-44 (1990).
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Law. 783, 785(1995).
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intrinsic advantages, but because they bore comparatively less stringent regulatory
burdens than U.S. banks did.
94
Accordingly, non-banking institutions and foreign banks
were more flexible in lowering their costs to attract businesses. For example, when
companies try to get funds from financial markets, they must seek financing with the
lowest cost. There is no difference between the funds from commercial loans and from
public capital markets, except that getting money from commercial banks costs more.
Therefore, companies tend to obtain funds from securities markets. Commercial banks
keep losing their markets, because their clients would lower their cost of obtaining
financing by selling securities instead of getting loans from commercial banks. 6
Technology innovations have affected substantially the competitiveness of
commercial banks in the modern market. The previous structure of legal restrictions on
bank activities has already negatively effected the stability and competitive fairness in the
U.S. financial markets.
97 One important financial market development is securitization.
Since there is no legal barrier to investment firms or other nonfinancial institutions
issuing loans, the securities industry and other nonfinancial industries have increasingly
entered into traditional banking areas by providing loan equivalents through the
securitization process.
98
While lowering capital costs and improving the capital allocation
process, securitization has resulted in a diminution in demand for commercial loans.
Since banks were subject to more stringent activity restrictions, they have been kept out
of many profitable businesses. 1 Securitization also jeopardizes the quality of assets held
by banks, because financial institutions only securitize the best assets in a bank's
id
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See Macey, supra note 49, at 207.
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portfolio. Since many profitable companies that meet the requirement for securitization
would choose securities markets as their financial resource, banks have been forced to
concentrate on increasingly risky borrowers who have relatively serious information
problems. 102
In the traditional deposit-taking and credit businesses, banks have been losing
consumers, who increasingly are investing a great part of their savings in other markets
which are more attractive and profitable than deposits. 10 Investment banks and insurance
firms now are providing services similar to deposit-taking and credit-providing
businesses.
1
For example, many nonbank institutions can provide various deposit
equivalents, which can function as traditional deposit and checking accounts. 105 One of
these significant deposit equivalents is the money market fund, which can offer higher
interest rates to customers than traditional banking accounts do, without raising
unbearable risks. 106 Subject to some exceptions under commercial banking law, a
securities firm can purchase a single thrift institution as a subsidiary.
107
Thus, the
securities firm can provide services traditionally offered by thrift institutions covered by
1 OS
FDIC insurance. Through some loopholes in the bank regulatory framework,
investment firms can provide various kinds of services traditionally associated with
commercial banks, thus becoming financial supermarkets, which can offer one-stop
financial shopping. 1 Besides investment banks, other financial entities have also moved
aggressively into various financial businesses, providing financial products such as credit
cards, traveler's checks, and financial management accounts. 110 As a result, commercial
101
Id.
102
Id. at 207-10.
103
See Williams & Jacobsen, supra note 92, at 786.
104
Id.
105
See Eaton, supra note 98, at 1201.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1202.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1203-07.
m
Id. at 1207-09.
21
banks have to face fierce competition from both financial and non-financial enterprises in
traditional banking businesses. Moreover, when commercial banks have turned to more
risky business areas, they still can not avoid the increasingly intense competition from
non-banking organizations."
Although banks have sought to engage in the securities business, they have not
been able to compete effectively with investment banks partially because of the extensive
activity restrictions in previous U.S. banking law that permitted banks to allocate their
1 1 7
investments only to limited areas, which are not always profitable. This, in turn, led to
1 1 ^
a misallocation of assets by commercial banks as normal market participants.
Moreover, since commercial banks 1) need more capital to fund their lending operations,
2) are subjected to more stringent capital requirements, and, 3) move assets at a much
lower rate than investment banks, commercial banks have greater exposure to both credit
risk and interest-rate risk. 114 Accordingly, the advantage of FDIC insurance can not
overcome the disadvantage flowing from comparatively narrow business options.
In order to deal effectively with both domestic non-banking organizations and
international universal banks, U.S. banking organizations have to maintain existing
customers and to develop new businesses. 115 While economic development and
technology advancement have transformed the financial market, the previous regulatory
regime on bank investment activities prevents banks from competing effectively with
non-banking institutions and foreign firms in both domestic and international markets. 116
If banks continue to shrink their market shares and take on higher risks in commercial
• 117
loans, they will collectively threaten the safety and soundness of the banking system.
in
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This consequence would be directly contrary to the original purpose of separating the
commercial and investment banking businesses.
C. Reciprocity concerns
While U.S. banking organizations were subject to stringent activities restrictions
under the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act, their subsidiaries have
enjoyed the benefits of more relaxed regulation when operating abroad. Subject to some
limitations on underwriting and dealing in certain equity securities, foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. banks and bank holding companies were allowed to underwrite and deal in debt
and equity securities in foreign countries under Regulation K of the Bank Holding
Company Act. Realizing that these limits on bank securities activities have reduced the
competitive ability of U.S. banking organizations, the Federal Reserve Board
implemented Regulation K Revisions. 119 The Regulation K Revisions liberalized
limitations on U.S. banks engaging in securities activities such as underwriting and
dealing in equity securities.
1
Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, also called the Edge Act, authorizes
national banks to own so-called Edge Act corporations for the purpose of conducting
international banking activities. 121 An Edge Act corporation is a domestic subsidiary of a
U.S. bank that is formed for the purpose of engaging in international financial
operations.
122
Banks have found that establishing Edge Act Corporations is attractive
because they can engage in a broad range of international financial businesses without
being subject to state law restrictions. 123 These corporations have sufficiently expanded
powers that enable them to compete in the international market effectively. 124
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Subject to Glass-Steagall Act restrictions, which generally prohibited banks from
engaging in securities business, banks operating domestically could not enjoy the benefit
of less restrictive regulations. It was questioned why U.S. banking institutions could be
subject to more relaxed restrictions on their investment activities abroad, if the separation
of commercial banking from investment banking is so important to protect the safety and
soundness of banking system. 125 It seemed unreasonable to relax restrictions on U.S.
banking overseas, while prohibiting banks within the U.S. from entering the investment
banking business. If allowing U.S. banks abroad to principally engage in the securities
business does not threaten the stability of the U.S. banking system, regulatory authorities
should also remove activities restrictions on banks operating domestically. 126
Under the national treatment approach, foreign banks, when operating in the
United States, should be subject to the United States banking regulations which restrict
bank investment activities. Although there were some exceptions from the general
prohibitions, and there were some exceptions that were only applied to foreign banks,
these exceptions were somewhat narrow. " For instance, E.U. banks could conduct a full
range of financial activities under the Second Banking Directive. When these universal
banks are operating their subsidiaries in the United States, they are subject to the U.S.
banking regulatory regime. Although the U.S. had a more relaxed approach to foreign
banks than to domestic banks, E.U. credit institutions were not permitted to provide the
full range of services to the same extent as they have been permitted by the Second
Banking Directive and their home country regulations. 128
From the United State perspective, it has offered a better-than-national treatment
to E.U. credit institutions, because there were some special exemptions applied to E.U.
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banks from the general prohibitions of Bank Holding Company Act. According to U.S.
banking regulations, E.U. credit institutions had broader powers than U.S. domestic
banking organizations did. However, from the European Union point of view, the United
States failed to offer the same competitive opportunities available to U.S. banks, and also
failed to meet the conditions of effective market access under Article 9 of the Second
Banking Directive, because the United States was imposing barriers to E.U. credit
institutions.
130
For example, subject to Regulation K under the Bank Holding Company
Act, U.S. banking organizations could conduct a broader range of activities, including
some equity securities underwriting, in the European Union than they were allowed to
conduct in the United States. 131 Consequently, the European Union considered that the
United States did not provide the same competitive opportunities to E.U. banks who were
seeking access to the United States market as opportunities the European Union have
provided to U.S. banks in the E.U. market. More specifically, compared to U.S. firms
operating in European Union countries, E.U. credit institutions were subject to more
stringent regulatory regime when operating in the United States. 133 Thus, under the
principle of reciprocal treatment, the European Union would have incentives to negotiate
with the United State to moderate its banking regulations to allow E.U. banks to engage
in the full range of financial services that they can engage in under E.U. law and home
state laws.
While banks have had considerable success in expanding into securities business,
that expansion has not been smooth or effortless. Competition both from domestic
investment banks and international financial institutions has narrowed their options for
maintaining reasonable profit margins and different regulatory regimes have increased
their operating costs. Nevertheless, U.S. banks have started to benefit from a liberalizing
129
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banking regulatory regime, and with the implementation of the Financial Services Act of
1999, U.S. banks and bank holding companies can now legally provide a full range of
financial services.
133
Id.
CHAPTER IV
EXPANDED BANKING POWERS
Despite the manifest restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act on banks' ability to
engage in securities and securities-related activities, national banks, bank holding
companies and their non-bank affiliates aggressively entered the investment banking
business in the 1980s and 1990s. 134 Most of this expansion can be attributed to
technology innovations, declines in the traditional deposit-taking and commercial lending
businesses, rapid expansion of the securities business, favorable interpretations of
existing law by banking agencies and courts, expanded activities in foreign countries, and
the globalization of financial markets.
135
This chapter analyzes regulatory changes and
judicial interpretations that significantly have broadened banking powers in financial
markets, and evaluates the recent trend of mergers and acquisitions of investment banks
by bank holding companies.
134 See Northern & Olive, supra note 15, at 267.
135
See George G. Kaufman & Larry R. Mote, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and Judicial
Reinterpretation, 107 banking L.J. 388, 400 (1990). Lhe author gives five major reasons that attributes to
accelerated expansion of bank securities powers:
"1
. Improvements in technology that have reduced sharply the costs of information processing and
communications. The new technology held out the promise of economies of scope in conducting
expanded securities activities alongside the bank's currently permissible securities, lending, and deposit
activities. In some cases, these expanded activities can be offered using in-place personnel.
2. Search for new activities as profits from traditional commercial banking activities have declined. This
phenomenon is particularly true of lending to large, high-grade corporation, many of which are finding
it cheaper to sell their own commercial paper than to borrow from banks. Techology has contributed to
this development by increasing the availability and reducing the cost of credit information and analysis
for these firms to the public, thereby eroding commercial bank's comparative advantages in this area.
3. The perceived rapid growth and large profits in full-service securities activities at least up to and
through the time of the stock market crash in October 1987 as the volume and complexity of securities
have both increased sharply.
4. More liberal interpretations of the language of existing legislation by both the regulatory agencies and
the courts.
5. The growing internationalization of financial markets, which has provided U.S. banks with experience
in securities activities in many foreign countries, and intensified competition with foreign banks in both
domestic and foreign markets."
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Federal banking agencies and the courts have eroded limitations on bank
investment activities set by the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act. 13t
According to favorable agency interpretations and court holdings, commercial banks and
bank holding companies have successfully engaged in securities and securities-related
areas, such as brokerage activities, underwriting and dealing securities, own-account
investments, and mutual funds. 137 As a result, national banks and bank holding
companies are able to involve in extensive non-banking businesses that most U.S.
investment banks have engaged in.
A. Expanded Banking Powers by Financial Agency Interpretations and Judicial
Precedence
When national banks were trying to compete with securities firms in investment
businesses, the OCC has rendered favorable interpretations that reduced limitations under
the Glass-Steagal Act.
139
In addition, by implementing its new Operating Subsidiaries
Rule, the OCC has allowed national banks to engage in a wide range of securities
activities through their operating subsidiaries.
140
The Federal Reserve Board has also
broadened the scope of businesses in which bank holding companies can engage through
their nonbank affiliates. For example, in late 1996 and 1997, through substantial revisions
to the regulatory regime by the Federal Reserve Board, banking holding companies were
allowed to engage in broader securities underwriting and dealing activities.
Generally, the Courts have helped banking agency interpretations in favor of
expansion of banking powers, if these interpretations are reasonable, and not arbitrary
136
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and capricious. 142 For example, the OCC and Federal Reserve interpretations easily met
the requirement of reasonableness, when they authorize banks to engage in a variety of
securities activities outside the enumerated activities permitted by federal banking law. 143
The Court has expressly found that the business of banking is an expansive concept that
is not limited to those enumerated activities in the federal banking law. 144 More
specifically, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Court had established that banking organizations
and their subsidiaries can engage in investment advisory, securities brokerage,
commercial paper placement, and even securities underwriting and selling activities, such
as dealing in corporate debt and equity securities. 145
a. Brokerage Activities
The U.S. banking law has allowed commercial banks to buy and sell securities
upon the order of and for the accounts of their customers. 146 Until the late 1970s,
although the Glass-Steagall Act did not plainly prohibit discount brokerage services, the
OCC had discouraged active securities brokerage services by national banks. 147 However,
in the early 1980s, when Securities Pacific National Bank applied to offer discount
1 4R
brokerage Services through a new subsidiary, the OCC approved this application. In
1983, the Federal Reserve Board approved the BankAmerica Corporation's application to
acquire the country's largest discount broker, Charles Schwab, and operate it as a
subsidiary of the holding company. 14 Although Securities Industry Association
challenged the OCC and Federal Reserve Board's interpretations on brokerage services,
the Supreme Court upheld these two financial agencies' approvals, holding that
42
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Regulation Y permits banking institutions to engage in discount brokerage services. 150 In
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, the court has ruled that banks can operate discount
brokerage offices in different states without being subject to branching restrictions. 151
Regulation Y has considered some permissible discount brokerage services to be
activities incidental to the business of banking. 15 Subject to some limitations, banks and
bank holding companies may also provide investment research and advisory activities to
sophisticated investors.
15
Since 1984, the Federal Reserve Board has authorized
subsidiaries of bank holding companies to provide full brokerage services to individuals
and companies, including investment companies. In its interpretative letters, the OCC
has also authorized banks to conduct full securities brokerage services,
b. Underwriting and Dealing in Securities
The Glass-Steagall Act authorized commercial banks to underwrite and deal in
some bank-eligible securities, such as government securities, securities of the bank itself,
and securities of other national banks. 1 6 Underwriting and dealing in commercial paper
by banks was also not subject to Glass-Steagall restrictions, 1 " but in its initial Section 20
approval orders, the Federal Reserve Board only permitted underwriting and dealing in
commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
However, in 1987, the Federal Reserve Board began to authorize nonbank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies and foreign banks to engage in underwriting and dealing in
securities.
159
Then the Federal Reserve Board broadened its rulings approving bank
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holding companies to underwrite and deal in corporate debt and equity securities. 16
However, there were a lot of limitations on affiliates of bank holding companies. Section
20 subsidiaries had to be separately capitalized and were subject to a number of firewalls
that were designed to ensure the safety and soundness of depository institutions.
Moreover, the Federal Reserve Board set a strict revenue limitation on ineligible
activities of section 20 affiliates. The original limit on revenue derived from ineligible
securities was 5% of the subsidiary's total revenues. 162 Then, in 1989, when the Federal
Reserve authorized subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in all
types of corporate securities, the revenue limit on ineligible activities was increased to
10%. 163 The ceiling on the percentage of revenues derived from ineligible activities of a
nonbank affiliate was raised to 25% in late 1996. 164 The new revenue limitation
significantly broadened the power of bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in
ineligible securities through their affiliates. Thus, while there was not meaningful
legislative modification to financial regulatory regime, the Federal Reserve Board has
made a "prudent march toward financial services modernization."
c. Mutual funds
The mutual fund industry has grown rapidly during recent two decades. As part of
their business diversification, banks and bank holding companies have been successfully
involved in the mutual fund industry. National banks and bank holding companies have
been authorized to sell mutual funds either directly or through their subsidiaries.
166 Bank
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holding companies can organize, sponsor, and manage a closed-end fund. 167 Moreover,
the Federal Reserve Board has determined that providing administrative services to
mutual funds is closely related to banking.
168
In September 1997, the OCC issued an
interpretive letter permitting an operating subsidiary of a bank to sell mutual fund
shares.
16
d. Securities Activities Abroad
A lot of banks have subsidiaries operating in foreign countries where commercial
banks are permitted to conduct a broader range of activities.
17
For example, U.S. bank
operating subsidiaries in the European Union countries may engage in full financial
services. Large bank holding companies have affiliates registered as members of major
stock exchanges in foreign countries and can provide investment advisory and brokerage
services to their clients regarding to foreign stock trading.
Apart from the above developments, favorable regulatory changes and judicial
interpretations have allowed national banks to provide a broad range of financial services.
These services include: underwriting and dealing in government securities, dealing in
debt instruments, Eurodollar instruments, and other eligible instruments, engaging in
private placement of commercial paper; providing full brokerage services and investment
advisory services, trading in futures, options, and derivative contracts, dealing in
mortgage backed securities, and underwrite and deal in debt and equity corporate
securities in accordance with certain limitations.
171 Bank holding companies have an even
broader range of permissible activities. Besides involvement in financial activities that
can be conducted by banks and operating subsidiaries, bank holding companies can
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engage in additional securities activities approved by the Federal Reserve Board. 172
Through amendments to Regulation Y and codifying interpretations, the Federal Reserve
Board has allowed bank holding companies to engage in a broad range of financial
activities, including investment advisory and fund-management activities, dealing in most
exchange-traded futures and options, underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible
activities to a certain extent, and other securities activities that are permissible for
national banks.
17
B. OCC's New Operating Subsidiary Rule
In Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co, the Supreme Court
expressly held that the business of banking is not limited to the enumerated powers in the
National Bank Act, and that it would give substantial deference to reasonable decisions
by the Comptroller of the Currency interpreting permissible activities of national
banks.
174
According to this Supreme Court decision, the OCC has discretion to authorize
new activities for national banks that are beyond enumerated powers. Subsequently, the
Comptroller of the Currency announced its new Operating Subsidiary Rule on November
1 IS *
20, 1996. This new rule, effective on December 31, 1996, would allow national banks
to engage in a broader range of activities through their subsidiaries.
176
The new standard
provides: "a national bank may establish or acquire an operating subsidiary to conduct, or
may conduct in an existing operating subsidiary, activities that are part of or incidental to
the business of banking, as determined by the Comptroller of the Currency, pursuant to
12 U.S.C. 24( Seventh), and other activities permissible for national banks or their
subsidiaries under other statutory authority." 177
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The old Part 5 Rules allowed national banks only to conduct activities that were
"part of or incidental to the business of banking" through operating subsidiaries. 7K In
order to conduct these incidental activities through the operating subsidiary, the parent
bank had to own at least 80% of the voting shares of the subsidiary. 179 Under the old Part
5 Rule, if a national bank intended to conduct new activities through an operating
subsidiary, it had to file an application to the Comptroller of the Currency. Adhering to
some prudent banking principles, the Comptroller had the authority to determine whether
1 Q 1
these new activities were legally permissible for an operating subsidiary of a bank.
The new Part 5 Rule significantly expands permissible activities of national banks
in several ways. First, it added flexibility for the operating subsidiary structure by
reducing minimum voting stock ownership requirement by national banks to 50% from
80%. 182 To qualify the new rule's requirement, the parent bank has to own at least 50% of
the voting stock of the subsidiary or otherwise control the subsidiary. To control a
subsidiary, the parent bank could even hold less than 50% of the voting interest in the
subsidiary, if no other person owns more than 50%. 184 Moreover, a national bank may
establish or operate an operating subsidiary by means of "a corporation, limited liability
1 8S
company or similar entity".
Second, the new Part 5 Rule enhances flexibility of the OCC approval procedures.
For certain businesses, a well-capitalized bank may submit an "after-the-fact notice" to
the OCC within ten days after it establishes or operates an operating subsidiary. For
some activities such as securities brokerage, underwriting and dealing in permissible
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securities, the OCC may conduct expedited review, which means that an national bank's
application to conduct these activities through a operating subsidiary is approved after ten
i 0-7
t
days of submitting the application, unless notifies otherwise. If a bank intends to be
involved in some new activities that do not belong to above-mentioned categories, it must
file an application to the OCC and get approval before it conducts such a new activity
through an operating subsidiary. Therefore, through the new Part 5 Rule, national
banks may enjoy less burdensome procedural requirements when they are trying to
broaden their businesses.
Another change, perhaps the most controversial one, is that the OCC has
1 RQ
increased new activities in which operating subsidiaries can engage. Under the new
rule, the OCC has the authority to allow an operating subsidiary to engage in activities
that are prohibited to its parent bank.
190 The new rule does not explicitly list certain
activities that are permissible to bank operating subsidiaries. Instead, it allows the OCC
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a new activity is part of, or incidental to the
business of banking. 192 Accordingly, the new rule significantly expands the OCC's
authority as well as permissible activities of bank operating subsidiaries. For example, the
OCC may allow bank operating subsidiaries to engage is the underwriting of corporate
securities.
1
Since section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act explicitly prohibited banks from
engaging in corporate securities underwriting, the OCC mainly relied on section 20 of the
Act to authorize bank operating subsidiaries to conduct ineligible securities activities.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board has allowed section 20 subsidiaries of banking
holding companies to engage in ineligible activities as long as they are not their primary
187
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activities.
195
Subject to the Fed interpretations on "engaged principally" in bank-ineligible
activities, an operating subsidiary can earn up to 25% of its revenue from ineligible
activities.
196
As a result, the OCC reinterpreted Glass-Steagall Act in a way that allows
bank operating subsidiaries to involve in a wide variety of financial businesses in which
affiliates of bank holding companies can engage.
On December 11, 1997, applying the new operating-subsidiary rule, the OCC
approved Zions First National Bank's application to underwrite and deal in revenue
bonds through its operating subsidiaries. 197 In its decision, the OCC explained that
underwriting and dealing in revenue bonds is part of or incidental to the business of
banking. Although underwriting and dealing in revenue bonds is considered to be one
of the bank-ineligible securities activities, affiliates of bank holding companies and
operating subsidiaries of national banks may engage in this business so long as they are
not engaged principally in it. 199 In addition, the OCC applied the Federal Reserve Board's
25% revenue limitation on Zions' proposed securities activities. 00 Since the operating
subsidiary of Zions would limit its income earned from underwriting and dealing in
revenue bonds up to 25% of its total revenue, it is not principally engaged in ineligible
securities activities.
201 One may predict that national banks will be able to enjoy greater
freedom to involve in profitable financial businesses.
C. The Fed's New Operating Standards for Section 20 Subsidiaries
Although the Federal Reserve Board attacked the OCC's new operating-
subsidiary rule, which has expanded permissible investment activities of bank
195 Mat 1320.
196
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subsidiaries, it took significant steps to eliminate old section 20 firewalls effective in
1987 that separate extraordinary securities activities from traditional banking. It intended
to facilitate bank holding companies' affiliation with subsidiaries engaged in investment
banking businesses. In a meeting on August 21, 1997, the Federal Reserve Board
approved a proposal replacing old firewalls with new operating standards that would
facilitate bank holding companies' ability to conduct securities business through their
section 20 subsidiaries. 2 The Board believed that many of the old limitations had
became unnecessarily burdensome in current regulatory regime. 204 Under the new
operating standards, bank holding companies would be able to reduce costs, enhance
services, and increase their competitive ability, while ensuring the safety and soundness
of banking business and avoiding conflict of interests. ° Through its new operating
standards of section 20 subsidiaries, the Federal Reserve Board has balanced the
traditional concerns pertaining to possible abuses arising from bank securities activities
with the reality that banking organizations have to improve their competitive equality in
the rapid-changing financial markets. 206 Moreover, the new Operating Standards would
reduce cumbersome compliance burdens on bank holding companies to engage in
investment banking businesses. Therefore, bank holding companies would be able to
increase their competitiveness and provide one-stop financial services at lower costs.
These substantial revisions to section 20 rules would also facilitate acquisitions of
investment banks and securities firms by bank holding companies.
D. Acquisitions of Investment banks by Bank Holding Companies
The Federal Reserve Board's significant revisions to the regulatory regime that
restricted bank holding companies affiliation with investment banks has made it possible
Fed Votes to Replace Section 20 Firewalls with New Standards, 16 No. 17 Banking PoFy Rep. 5 (1997).
204
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907
for bank holding companies to acquire securities firms directly. Because the Federal
Reserve Board has increased the revenue limitation on ineligible activities from 10% to
25%, and most investment firms' revenues from underwriting and dealing bank-ineligible
securities are close to or even less than 25%, it is feasible for bank holding companies to
acquire securities firms without reducing their ineligible securities activities. After the
Federal Reserve Board adopted its new operating standards, a lot of investment bank
acquisitions by bank holding companies have taken place. One of the major
acquisitions is the Nationsbank acquiring Montgomery Securities.
Nationsbank Corporation, a bank holding company, sought approval from the
Federal Reserve Board to acquire Montgomery Securities, which is principally involved
in various investment banking businesses, such as underwriting and dealing in all types of
debt and equity securities, government obligations, and money market instruments,
providing financial and investment advisory services, and offering securities brokerage,
private placement, and other financial services^ In November, 1997, the Federal
? 1 1
Reserve Board (Board) issued its order of approval of this acquisition. After the
successful merger, the newly acquired section 20 subsidiary can take advantage of
accessing a much stronger capital that would support its future growth in securitized
207
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companies include:
(1) Bankers Trust New York Corp. acquired Alex. Brown Inc. (Baltimore).
(2) Fleet Financial Group Inc. acquired Quick & Reilly Group Inc. (New York).
(3) Chase Manhattan Corp. acquired Hambrecht & Quist Group (San Francisco).
(4) BankAmerica Corp. acquired Montgomery Securities (San Francisco).
(5) First Union Corp. acquired EVEREN Capital Corp. (Chicargo).
(6) US Bancorp acquired Piper Jaffray Cos. (St. Paul).
(7) KeyCorp acquired McDonald & Co. Investments Inc.
(8) First Union Corp. acquired Wheat First Butcher & Singer (Richmond).
(9) BankAmerica Corp. acquired Robertson Stephens & Co. (San Francisco)
( 10)PNC Bank Corp. aquired Hilliard-Lyons Inc. (Louisville).
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transactions." " NationsBank (now known as Bank of America) can provide a broader
range of financial services through the new section 20 subsidiary.
By acquiring investment banks as their section 20 subsidiaries, bank holding
companies can immediately offer existing customers a broader range of financial
products.
214
Acquisitions of investment banks would give the acquiring bank holding
company immediate access to various resources accumulated by investment banking
businesses.
215
Investment banks also have incentives to merge with bank holding
companies. When acquired by bank holding companies, investment banks will be able to
access to stronger capital bases that enable them to conduct larger securitized
transactions.
216
In addition, the acquired securities firms gain access to existing corporate
customers."
Although significant changes on administrative and agency rulings have made it
much more feasible for bank holding companies to acquire investment banks, the
previous existing restrictions still constrained the structuring and consummation of these
acquisitions and mergers. 218 However, the Financial Service Act of 1999 repealed the
affiliation restrictions under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act
so that commercial banks, securities firms and insurance companies may affiliate with
each other as financial conglomerates.
219
Thus, the new legislation finally ratified the
formation of Citigroup, the combination of Citicorp and the Travelers Group, which had
contained nonconforming businesses under the Bank Holding Company Act."
Citicorp/Travelers merger has been considered as one of the necessary catalysts that
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213
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urged Congress to pass the financial modernization reform bills and allow affiliations
among banks, insurance companies, and securities firms.
In order to consummate the merger with Citicorp. Travelers applied to the Federal
Reserve Board in May. N L)S for a new bank holding company charter and then the newly
chartered holding company would acquire all voting shares of Citicorp and all of ticorp's
subsidiaries.""" After carefully considering all information related to this transaction, and
reviewing testimonies ol interested members of public, the Federal Reserve Board
granted conditional permission for the formation of Citigroup."""' The new bank holding
company had to terminate or divest certain activities that were not permissible for
banking holding companies."" Travelers was extensively involved in securities,
insurance, financial advisory and other financial services both domestically and
internationally. The major issue in the Citicorp Traveler's merger was that the newly
formed holding company would be extensively involved in insurance businesses, which
would be illegal under the previous regulatory framework. The Federal Reserve Board
ordered Citigroup to divest its unacceptable businesses in two years and then grant as
many as three one-year extensions to the divestiture period."" Thus. Citicorp had up to
five years to wait until Congress completed financial services reform legislation, while
keeping all o( its nonconforming activities. During the grace period, if the financial
modernization legislation were not passed. Citigoup would have to consider several
alternatives. It could divest its insurance underwriting businesses, give up its banking
charter, or incorporate in a foreign country."" But all of these alternatives are not optimal
for the new financial group to be prosperous in the future. Fortunately, the Financial
"' See Laura J. Cox. The Impact ofthe Citicorp-Travelers Group Merger on Financial Woderization ami
the Repeal ofGIass-Steagall, 23 Nova L. Re\ 899, 922 ( 1999).
" Id. Also see Bradley K. Sabel. The Citicorp Travelers Merger and The Bank Holding Company Act,
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Service Act of 1999 was signed into law by the U.S. president in November 1999, and
Citigroup was able to keep all its financial services without worrying about restrictions on
bank-ineligible activities.
"" See Cox, supra note 221, at 923-25.
See Geoffrey M. Connor, The Financial Services Act of 1999-The Gramm-Leach-Blilev Act, 71 Pa. B.A.
Q. 29, 29 (2000).
CHAPTER V
RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORM
International and domestic financial markets have experienced dramatic changes.
Banking organizations have made many efforts to expand their business opportunities in
both domestic and international markets. As part of the expanded businesses, securities
activities conducted by commercial banks, bank holding companies, and their affiliates
have increased significantly, especially in recent two decades. However, under the
previous regulatory framework, banks and bank holding companies have met many
obstructions when trying to keep their share of financial markets. Non-bank
organizations, such as securities and insurance firms have invaded into traditional
banking businesses. In addition, foreign bank institutions, such as E.U. universal banks
have competed with U.S. banks almost in any area. Accordingly, there have been a lot of
arguments contending that under the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act
regime, American banks have lost their competitive advantages when competing with
non-bank institutions and foreign banks. In response to these changes, Congress has
considered reforming the Glass-Steagall Act over the past two decades.
A. History of Recent Legislative Reform
Early in 1980, the Congress considered reforming financial service regulations.
In nearly twenty years, eight of the two-year Congresses have considered major financial
services reform legislation. Although these endeavors made varying degrees of
progress, they have all failed to finalize new legislation. These reform efforts failed
mainly because the major players in the three industries, commercial banking, investment
229
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230
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banking, and insurance, would not compromise their interests. When commercial
banks wanted to expand their powers into the securities industry and tried to repeal Glass-
Steagall restrictions, they encountered intense resistance by the securities industry, which
did not favor increased competition from commercial banks. Facing the vehement battles
among these industries, Congress lacked the political will to pass major financial services
reform legislation.
23 When Congress has to balance the interests of the competing
groups, it is difficult to favor one at the expense of another.
Although Congress failed to reach the final reform legislation in 1998, the
financial agencies have been very aggressive in dismantling some of the barriers imposed
by Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act to separate traditional banking
and investment banking industry. As discussed in previous Chapters, the lines between
commercial banking and the securities industry has been blurred by technology
innovations and development of new financial products. Facing the rapidly changing
financial market, banking regulators had a lot of incentives to break down restrictions on
bank securities activities. The OCC have reinterpreted banking regulations to permit
banks and their affiliates to engage in a wide variety of formerly bank-ineligible
securities activities.
234
These activities include brokerage, own-account investment,
-1 T C
mutual funds, and underwriting and dealing in corporate debt and equity securities.
The Federal Reserve Board has interpreted Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act to allow
bank holding companies to acquire full service securities underwriting and dealing
firms.
236 The limits on revenue from bank ineligible activities was started at 5%, moved
•
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10%, and then increased to 25%." After the Federal Reserve Board adopted the new
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operating standards for section 20 subsidiaries, there has been a stream of acquisitions of
securities firms by bank holding companies. The financial services reform has actually
taken place at the regulatory level. But there is still a need to pass formal statutory reform
by Congress. It was believed that the Citicorp/Travelers merger could be one of the
catalysts that would urge Congress to pass financial modernization legislation and allow
affiliations among banks, securities firms and insurance companies.
The 105th Congress made significant efforts on Glass-Steagall reform. In early
1997, several legislative proposals on the subject of reform were introduced in
Congress.
240
The Treasury Department released a comprehensive financial service
modernization proposal, as a legislative proposal, to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act.
These legislative proposals, introduced in the form of bills, authorized banking
organizations and their affiliates to engage in: "(1) securities underwriting and dealing
activities; (2) merchant banking activities; and (3) insurance underwriting, brokerage and
agency activities."
242 The House Banking Committee has held extensive hearings
regarding the issues associated with the expansion of banking powers and related
functional regulation.
243
The Banking and Commerce Committees passed bills to expand
the range of financial activities that can be conducted by banking organizations and their
subsidiaries and affiliates.
244
In addition, these financial reform bills authorized banks to
own securities firms either directly by bank subsidiaries or though holding company
subsidiaries.
45
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To some extent, these financial reform bills have considered the necessity of
making certain bank securities activities subject to the SEC regulations under the federal
securities laws.
246 Consumer protection issues are also considered in these bills, because
many customers buy financial products from banks and might be affected by bank
securities activities.
47
Although related committees have achieved some progress in
financial law reform, the problems of previously existing regulatory regime were not
totally resolved because of the differences between those bills. There was a need for
Congress to make further legislative progress to balance relevant interests between
banking and securities industries.
The 106th Congress finally passed the financial services reform legislation,
known as H.R. 10 in the House and S.900 in the Senate. Congress and the White House
have agreed to cooperate in this new legislation. On November 12, 1999, President
Clinton signed into law the Financial Services Act of 1999, also called Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act,
249
representing the successful result of the most important financial reform in
recent years. This legislation repeals parts of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank
Holding Company Act, which have prohibited affiliations among banks, securities firms,
and insurance companies. This act creates a new form of holding company—the
Financial Holding Company. 251 Financial holding companies are authorized to engage
activities that are "financial in nature or incidental to such financial activities", including
commercial banking, insurance, and securities activities. 5! The Financial Services Act
embraces the functional regulation model within which bank securities activities are
subject to SEC regulation." As result, it would eliminate bank exemptions from the
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247
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broker-dealer provisions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 254 The Act would
also eliminate the exclusion of banks from the definition of investment advisors under the
Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 55 Although the
unusually complex new law is a compromise among various financial industries and a
settlement of the turf war among different financial regulators, financial holding
companies will be able to take advantage of the new legislation to significantly expand
their powers. It is believed that this financial modernization legislation will give financial
institutions unprecedented opportunities in future growth. 256
B. Summary of Expanded Financial Powers of Banks in the New Legislation
(S.900/H.R. 10)
The purpose of the Financial Services Act of 1999 is to create a prudential
framework that enhances competition in the financial service industry, while allowing the
affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial services
providers. This legislation advocates a functional framework, in which securities
activities of financial holding companies are regulated by SEC, and banking activities are
subject to banking agency regulations.
There are seven titles in H.R. 10. Title I seeks to facilitate affiliation among
banking institutions, securities firms and insurance companies. 25 ' Title II provides that
functional regulation be the regulatory framework for financial holding companies.
Title III addresses some insurance regulatory issues.
261
Title IV provides provisions for
unitary saving and loan holding companies. 262 Title V addresses privacy issues. 263 Title
Significant Legislative Developments, supra note 234, at 59.
255 Mat 61-60.
David Berson, New Law Brings Growth Opportunities to Banks (Gramm-Leach Act), 12/3/99 Kansas
City Bus. J. (Mo.) 12, available at Westlaw, 1999 WL 24297993.
257
H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999)
258
Id. §111
259
Id. Title I
260
Id. Title II
261
Id. Title III
262
Id. Title IV
263
Id. Title V
46
VI discusses the modernization of federal home loan bank system. 6 Title VII discusses
other reform issues, such as ATM fees, community Reinvestment, and other regulatory
improvements. 265 For the purpose of the article, this part focuses on Title I and Title II,
which are closely related to regulations on bank securities activities.
Both the Senate and House bills were aimed at facilitating financial affiliations.
The new legislation repeals section 20 and section 32 of the Glass Steagall Act,266 which
prevented banks from affiliating with firms engaged principally in securities
underwriting, and restricted personnel overlaps. 267 It also amends section 4 of the Bank
Holding Company Act, eliminating nonbanking activity restrictions. It establishes a
new section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act that authorizes bank holding companies
to engage in new financial activities, if the bank holding companies are qualified as
financial holding companies. 269 However, a bank holding company may not engage in
new financial activities, unless it is qualified as a financial holding company. To be
eligible as a financial holding company, a bank holding company must meet certain
requirements relating to capitalization, management, and community needs. 271 Foreign
banks that operate branches or control financial companies in the United States are
subject to comparable capital and management standards.
New section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act permits financial holding
companies to engage in activities that the Federal Reserve Board has determined to be
financial in nature and incidental to such financial activities. Qualified bank holding
companies are also allowed to engage in activities that the Board determines are
264
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complementary to financial activities, or other activities that the Board determines not to
impose a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the bank and the financial
774.
system." It is a significant expansion of bank financial powers when the standard of
"closely related to banking" is changed to "financial in nature". 275
H.R. 10 contains a list of specifically authorized activities that are considered to
be financial in nature.
J The list includes securities underwriting, dealing, insurance, and
mutual funds, and other financial activities. A financial holing company may engage in
978
the listed activities without seeking prior permission from the Federal Reserve Board.
But the company must give the Federal Reserve Board a notice within 30 days after it
77Q
begins the activity." If a bank holding company seeks approval to conduct an additional
activity that is not listed in Section 4, the Federal Reserve Board may issue permission if
it determines that the new activity is financial in nature. The Federal Reserve Board
has the authority to determine whether a new activity is financial in nature or
incidental. However, the Board's discretion is not absolute. Before reaching its
274
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H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §103(1999). Activities considered financial in nature, in which FHCs will be able
to engage, include:
1. Lending, Exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding money or securities.
2. Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or
providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or broker for purposes of the foregoing.
3. Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an investment
company.
4. Issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets permissible for a bank to hold
directly.
5. Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities.
6. Engaging in any activity that the Board has determined, by order or regulation that is in effect on the
date of enactment of the Financial Services Act of 1999, to be so closely related...
7. Engaging, in the United States, in any activity that
i. a bank holding company may engage in outside the United States; and
ii. the Board has determined., to be usual in connection with the transaction of banking or other financial
operations abroad.
8. Directly or indirectly acquiring or controlling [a company] engaged in any activity not authorized
pursuant to this section. .
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decision, the Federal Reserve Board must consult with the Secretary of the Treasury
concerning applications or requests to engage in new activities. 28
!
The Secretary of the
Treasury has the ultimate authority to approve the Federal Reserve Board's determination
TO!
on new activities." The consultative process is designed to eliminate arbitrary
determinations and achieve efficient regulation.
Before the financial modernization bills were signed into law, the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury Department had vehement debates over whether operating subsidiaries
of banks should be allowed to engage in activities that are financial in nature. While the
Federal Reserve insisted that financial activities should be conduct by holding company
affiliates instead of bank subsidiaries, the OCC argued that national banks should be
allowed to be involved in financial activities through its operating subsidiaries, because
this would be more efficient and would not expose the deposit insurance fund to
additional risks. The Federal Reserve and the OCC finally made a compromise in the
new legislation. In the enacted Gramm-Leach Act, financial subsidiaries of national
banks (previously operating subsidiaries) are able to engage in financial or incidental
activities that are authorized for financial holding companies. However, there are still
some activity limitations on financial subsidiaries. Under the Gramm-Leach Act, bank
financial subsidiaries are prohibited from some financial activities that are permissible for
bank holding companies, such as insurance or tax-deferred annuities, real estate
development and investment, and merchant banking and insurance company portfolio
investments. 286 Securities activities of bank financial subsidiaries also will not encounter
legal constraints.
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C. Functional Regulation
H.R. 10 advocates a functional regulatory regime, within which banking activities
are regulated by bank regulators, and securities activities are regulated by securities
authorities. The rational of functional regulation is to take advantage of different types
TOO
of expertise particular financial agencies developed in supervising different activities.
It would be efficient and practical to delegate certain supervisory authorities to
appropriate regulators. The Federal Reserve Board would be the umbrella supervisor of
financial holding companies. 283 Commercial banking businesses would be subject to
functional regulation by the OCC, the FDIC, OTS or a related state-banking
department.
290
Securities and insurance activities would be regulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and relevant State securities and insurance authorities .
The Federal Reserve Board may require a bank holding company or its subsidiary
to submit reports pertaining to its financial condition, risk management systems,
transactions with depository institution subsidiaries, and its compliance with the Bank
Holding Company Act and other federal laws that the Board has specific jurisdictions to
enforce." The Board has the authority to examine bank holding companies and their
subsidiaries.
29
However, the Board's authority is limited when it examines functionally
regulated subsidiaries.
294 The Board may not examine a functionally regulated subsidiary
of a bank holding company unless it believes that (1) the subsidiary's activities would
pose a material risk to the safety and soundness of the affiliated depository institution, (2)
the examination is necessary to give adequate information about systems of controlling
risks or, (3) the subsidiary is not in compliance with related regulations that the Board has
286
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jurisdiction to enforce. 29 ' Before the Board takes actions against a functionally regulated
subsidiary, it must review relevant reports that the financial holding company has
prepared for functional regulators.
296
Then, it must have reasonable cause to believe an
affiliated depository institution is facing material risk because of the subsidiary's
activities.
7
In order to protect the overall safety and soundness of the financial system,
federal banking agencies are authorized to impose prudential safeguards on transactions
*)QO
and relationships between a depository institution and its affiliates." The OCC and the
Federal Reserve Board are required to review the restrictions and requirements they
adopted to avoid significant risks to the safety and soundness of financial system. If
there is not a continuing need for these prudential safeguards, the banking regulators
should modify such requirements or restrictions to eliminate unnecessary regulatory
burdens.
300
Title II of the Financial Services Act provides major provisions of functional
regulation of bank securities activities. H.R. 10 would eliminate bank exemptions from
the federal securities laws with respect to broker-dealer activities.
301
If securities
activities are conducted within the bank itself, the bank should register as brokers and
dealers with the SEC. 302 If securities activities are conducted by an affiliate, this affiliate
must be a registered broker-dealer subject to SEC regulation. 3 3 However, there are
limited exceptions that banks do not have to register as brokers and dealers for certain
securities activities.
304
These activities include traditional banking businesses such as
commercial paper and exempted securities, third-party networking arrangements, trust
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activities, certain stock purchase plans such as employee and shareholder benefit plans,
dividend reinvestment plans, and issuer plans, sweep accounts, affiliate transactions,
private securities offerings, safekeeping and custody services, identified banking
products, and municipal activities.
305
H.R. 10 adds a new subsection about new hybrid
products of Section 15 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 306 A new hybrid product may
not be one of the products that banks can sell without registering as brokers and dealers
with the SEC. However, the SEC is required to act by rulemaking before it regulates any
bank sales of these new products. 307 Prior to commencing a rulemaking process, the SEC
has to consult with the Federal Reserve Board about the registration requirement. In
the rulemaking process, the SEC needs to prove that the new product is a security and it
is a new hybrid product.
309
In addition, the SEC has to whether imposing the registration
requirement will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
310
By amending the Investment Advisors Act and Investment Company Act, H.R. 10
eliminates the bank exemptions from the definition of investment advisors with respect to
investment advisory activities.
311 Under the new legislation, if a bank or a bank holding
company itself advises a registered investment company, this bank or holding company is
included in the term of investment advisers.
312
If a bank provides investment advisory
services to investment companies by "a registered separately identifiable department or
division", this department or division should be registered as an investment adviser under
the Investment Advisers Act. 313 However, bank trust departments may provide
investment advisory services to private individuals without registering with the SEC.
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By delegating regulatory obligations to different financial regulators, the new
legislation intends to effectively supervise and control the increasingly expanded
financial activities of financial conglomerates. To some degree, the functional regulatory
model in the new legislation achieves regulatory efficiency by eliminating regulatory
gaps that might risk effective supervision. However, the assumption that various financial
agencies would cooperate each other in a perfect way, which is a key factor of successful
functional regulation, is not fully justified. To efficiently protect the safety and soundness
of financial system, the new legislation should be carefully designed.
CHAPTER VI
APPROPRIATE REGULATORY REGIME FOR
MODERN BUSINESS OF BANKING
In the modernized regulatory regime provided by the Financial Services Act of
1999, financial holding companies are allowed to provide a full range of financial
services, including commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance
businesses.
15
Banking organizations are no longer prohibited from investment banking
businesses such as securities underwriting and selling, brokerage, investment advising,
and underwriting and selling financially-related products. In sum, the current financial
services reform have successfully expanded and diversified banking powers. However,
there are some issues that need careful attention.
A. Corporate Structure
It is very important to choose the right corporate structure for banking
organizations who are experiencing significant expansion and transformation. Generally,
there are three major corporate structures for integrating traditional banking and securities
activities—the universal bank, the holding company, and the operating subsidiaries of the
bank.
316
In universal banks, commercial banking, investment banking, and other
nontraditional banking activities are conducted within the bank itself. There is no need
to register separate subsidiaries or affiliates to provide non-commercial banking
• 1 1 Q
businesses. In this corporate structure, banks may take advantage of efficiencies that
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are raised from sharing of joint facilities, personnel, knowledge, brand name, and other
corporate resources.
31
' These efficiencies would reduce costs in the bank's businesses.
However, banks may be subject to greater risks that failures of new activities will directly
affect the solvency of the bank. 320
For corporations who are trying to obtain funds in the public capital market
through universal banks, there are more risks associated with dealing with these
entities. " These risks include: "the inclination of the banks to promote securities they
underwrite; pressure a corporation to use its underwriting capabilities by threatening to
discontinue a line of credit; or the tendency to force borrowers in financial difficulties to
issue risky securities to pay off loans".
The universal banking model prevails in the European Union, especially in
Germany. The European Union has a more liberal approach to corporate structure issues
than the United States does. The European Union allows their banking institutions to
choose their corporate structure, while the Second Banking Directive promotes the
universal banking model." It is believed in the European Union that the universal banks
in a liberal banking system have the greatest competitive advantages. 324 While both the
European Union and the United States are trying to enhance the competitiveness of their
banking organizations in the global market, banking regulators in the United States have
more concerns on the safety and soundness of its financial system. Therefore, banking
agencies in the U.S. have continually used firewalls to separate different financial
activities by either a holding company structure or an operating subsidiary model.
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The OCC favors the operating-subsidiary structure for nontraditional activities by
banks.
325 Under the new Operating Subsidiary rule, a bank may conduct investment
banking activities by a subsidiary separated from the depository institution. 32 By
providing nontraditional services through a separate subsidiary, the bank may lose some
effectiveness that a universal bank could enjoy, but losses in the subsidiary will not
directly affect the solvency of the bank. 327 In addition, in the operating subsidiary model,
banks can enjoy more benefits relating to smoothing of aggregate income flows from
different businesses than holding companies do. 328
In the financial holding company model, commercial banking and securities
activities are conducted by separated subsidiaries of a holding company. The Financial
Services Act of 1999 advocates the financial holding company structure. Bank holding
companies may conduct certain nonbanking activities that are financial in nature, if they
are qualified financial holding companies. If a bank holding company is not qualified
as a financial holding company, it is still subject to a lot of activity restrictions under the
Bank Holding Company Act. In other words, in order to provide full financial services,
bank holding companies have to meet some statutory requirements pertaining to
capitalization, risk management, and community needs. In addition, bank holding
companies have to file a declaration and certification with the Federal Reserve Board to
become financial holding companies. 3 ' The holding company structure may ensure that
failures of one affiliate will not directly risk the financial holding company, thus the
affiliated deposit institution will not be exposed to risky investments. However, reducing
25
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risks by firewalls between different affiliates may incur greater costs and decrease
profits.
332
It is argued that bank holding company structure may not be the best way to
organize financial services, since financial institutions are not likely to choose the holding
company structure if not required by law. While advocating the bank operating
subsidiary model, the OCC maintains that at least banks should be able to enjoy more
leeway to choose their own corporate structure. 334 Market incentives would make banks
to choose the form of organization that is most efficient and profitable. If operating a
subsidiary is more convenient and efficient for a bank to conduct financial businesses and
create profits at lower costs, there is no need to force banks to organize their financial
services in the holding company structure. There are some concerns that allowing
nonbank activities in bank operating subsidiaries will endanger the deposit insurance fund
to a greater extent.
335
It is believed that the failure of an operating subsidiary will directly
impair the bank's capital, while the failure of an affiliate of a holding company will cause
less risk to the holding company. 336 However, given the notion that the OCC actively
monitors banks and their operating subsidiaries, and a national bank may not invest or
lend more than 10% of its capital to a subsidiary, conducting nonbank activities in
operating subsidiaries will not put more risks to the safety and soundness of depository
institutions.
337
The Federal Reserve, however, insists on the financial holding companies
structure, and this prompted a "turf battle" between the Federal Reserve Board and the
OCC, pertaining to whether financial activities should be conducted through holding
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companies affiliate or bank operating subsidiaries. 338 A compromise was finally reached
in the Financial Services Act, under which banks that meet certain requirements on
capitalization, management, and community reinvestment will be able to conduct affiliate
activities either through holding company subsidiaries or financial subsidiaries of
banks.
339
Therefore, both the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC have the authority to
oversee banking activities. 340 Now U.S. banking organizations have some degree of
flexibility to choose their cooperate structure to engage in activities that are financial in
nature.
B. Functional Regulatory Model
The Financial Services Act addresses a functional regulatory scheme, in which
federal banking agencies regulate the banking activities of a bank holding company,
while SEC regulates the securities business of this company. 341 This functional model is
different from the institutional or entity model, within which banks are regulated under
the banking laws by banking agencies, and securities firms are regulated under the
securities laws by the SEC. 342
Compared to the institutional regulatory scheme, the functional approach has
some merit. Under the functional regulatory regime, different businesses are supervised
by different administrative agencies. Each agency would take responsibility to regulate
financial activities on which it has adequate knowledge and expertise, thus avoiding some
inefficient regulation. For example, since the SEC is familiar with the securities business,
it should be authorized to regulate bank securities activities that are not traditional
banking businesses. The new legislation also notices the complexity of new financial
products such as new hybrid products. In order to regulate the new hybrid products, the
38
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SEC has to go through a rulemaking process required by the new legislation. 343 The SEC
is also required to consult with the Federal Reserve Board before commencing the
rulemaking process to seek concurrence. This complex process would combine the
wisdom of both the securities regulator and banking agency to avoid arbitrary regulatory
decisions. To achieve the goal of effective regulation, securities and banking regulators
have to cooperate with each other on a lot of issues. To some degree, function regulation
could reduce regulatory burdens on federal banking agencies pertaining to non-bank
subsidiaries.
4 ~
The Federal Reserve Board is the umbrella supervisor of all financial holding
companies. 346 The Board has the authority to examine reports of any financial holding
company or subsidiary and to take enforcement action against such a holding company or
subsidiary for violation of law.
347 To protect a depository institution from risks arising
from other affiliates of the holding company, the federal banking agencies still have the
authority to impose capital requirements on the bank holding company and its
-J AQ
subsidiaries to avoid the misuse of bank resources. ' The Federal Reserve Board has
adopted capital adequacy guidelines that "require bank holding companies to maintain
adequate levels of capital on a consolidated basis",
349
in order to make sure that bank
holding companies operate without capital problems. As the umbrella supervisor, the
Board may identify the problems of a financial holding company or an affiliate of a
depository institution at an early stage, thus preventing serious problems from happening
to the depository institution.
350
In addition, in order to protect against the misuse of a
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bank's insured deposits, federal banking agencies have to effectively supervise
transactions between a deposit institution and its non-bank affiliates. 351
Proponents of functional regulation indicate that true functional regulation will
ensure competitive equality, regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, and adequate
consumer protection measures. Under the functional regulatory model, entities engaged
in similar transactions and products are subject to the same rules interpreted and
administered consistently by the same regulators, thus avoiding inconsistent application
of rules and regulations by different regulatory agencies. 35 Under this approach,
functional regulation would improve regulatory efficiency by "reducing conflict,
duplication, and overlap of the regulatory function". 354 Furthermore, proponents believe
that functional regulation would protect and benifit customers in all areas of financial
services by ensuring the widest range of financial products at the lowest cost to the
public.
355
The functional model would run efficiently to protect the safety and soundness of
financial system, if there is perfect cooperation among functional regulators. However,
the new legislation is, to a certain extent, a series of compromises reached by various
financial agencies.
356
Both the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC fought to be the
primary regulator of the new financial conglomerates. " In order to keep their regulatory
turf, they have been arguing whether activities that are financial in nature should be
conducted by holding company subsidiaries or operating subsidiaries. " The
consequence of the compromise is to delegate regulatory responsibilities of supervising
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financial holding companies among the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the SEC, and
other federal and state financial regulatory agencies.
35
;
Although the new legislation
authorizes the Federal Reserve Board as the umbrella regulator, it cannot solve a lot of
problems pertaining to inefficient cooperation among different financial agencies,
conflicting regulatory interpretations, and a lack of accountability.
360
It is argued that although functional regulation could solve some problems of the
institutional regulatory regime, the notion that regulation should be separated based on
businesses or products is flawed.
361
Functional regulation would be effective by
clarifying various regulators' jurisdictional line. Clearly drawn lines would eliminate
potential confusion and conflict among different regulatory agencies. However, it is
almost impractical to cleanly separate one regulator's jurisdictions from others. Since the
line between some financial services is not clear and some financial products are
increasingly interchangeable, it is difficult to determine whether these services should be
regulated by bank regulators, SEC, or other financial agencies. 362 Moreover, regulatory
concerns are not clearly distinguishable among various financial agencies. Functional
regulation cannot reduce inefficiencies resulting from conflicting interpretations of
regulations by different agencies. In addition, the functional model lacks flexibility to
accommodate rapidly changing financial businesses. 363 It is recommended that
regulations should focus directly on the risks instead of the function.
364 A system seeking
to control the risks of financial business can more effectively cope with the rapid
changing financial environment, while protecting the safety and soundness of banking
system in an efficient manner.
365
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C. Consumer Protection
The modernization of the business of banking will also greatly affect bank
customers' activities since they now can purchase almost all kinds of financial products
within one "financial supermarket". The previous legal barriers between banking and
securities activities has, to some degree, effectively protected bank customers' deposits
from involvement in risky investments, thus insuring the safety and soundness of the
banking system. Now, as cross-industry restrictions within the previous regulatory regime
are dismantled, protection of consumer rights becomes a serious concern in the
increasingly complex financial markets.
When H.R. 10 was originally introduced by the House Banking and Financial
Services Committee and House Commerce Committee, it did not contain provisions that
provided adequate consumer protection. Consumer advocates addressed two major
concerns of consumer protection. One is how can consumers access reliable financial
services at comparatively low costs. 368 The other is how to adequately protect consumers'
privacy in the increasingly sophisticated financial markets associated with increased
cross-industry affiliations.
Consumer advocates worry that despite the convenience, the one-stop shopping
provided by financial conglomerates will increase customers' costs when they are
consuming financial services. 370 They are concerned that improperly trained personnel
may abuse customers' reliance on banking services, aggressively persuading customers to
a*7
1
purchase unfamiliar financial products that might bear too many risks. Consumer
advocates also fear that the concentration of business powers within one financial
66
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conglomerate would weaken a customer's ability to negotiate when accepting services. 37
Therefore, if financial providers charge higher fees, consumers have to accept whatever
the financial conglomerates might offer.
Consumer advocates additionally worry about potential abuses by financial
conglomerates regarding confidential information of their customers.
37
It could be
predicted that a bank holding company would combine the private information about its
customers from its various affiliates, in order to take advantage of unified information
resources.
374
Since the current privacy regulations are not very stringent and do not place
burdens on companies to get permission from customers before sharing customers' files,
consumer advocates fear that financial conglomerates might inappropriately use private
information without customers' consent.
375
Because of pressures from various "interest" groups, the Financial Services Act of
1999 includes provisions addressing privacy issues. Title V of the Act requires every
financial institution to disclose its privacy policy pertaining to sharing of private
77 f\
information with affiliates and with third parties. Financial providers are required to
give customers a notice and an opportunity to "opt-out" of sharing their private records
777 • ...
and information with nonaffiliated third parties. Restrictions on information-sharing
imposed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act will be still effective, and more restrictive state
77R
law may preempt related regulations in the Act." However, the new legislation allows
the sharing of nonpublic personal information among affiliated institutions without
providing customers "opt-out" notices. Therefore, Consumer advocates' concerns on
72
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possible abuses pertaining to sharing of private records and information still exists under
the new regulatory regime.
D. International Regulatory Issues
Another issue is how to effectively supervise U.S. banking organizations that have
subsidiaries in foreign countries. It is more difficult and complicated for U.S. banking
agencies to effectively regulate and oversee activities of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
banks. Big failures of these subsidiaries may impact on the safety and soundness of their
parent banks in the United States, even though these affiliates are registered separately.
Therefore, besides the need for an appropriate regulatory framework in the United States
for expanded banking powers, it is also very important that banking activities should be
adequately supervised on the international level. Financial globalization and liberalization
have increased the need for international supervisory convergence on banking regulation.
However, because of significant disparities among different banking regulatory systems
in different countries, effective control of international banking businesses is far from
easy. There is a need for cooperation among banking agencies of different countries.
Furthermore, in order to avoid leaving supervisory gaps that might allow too much risk-
taking activities by international banks, both banking and securities regulators should
cooperate with each other in both domestic and international markets.
Although generally, the European Union have endeavored to liberalize financial
services throughout European countries, it also pays considerable attention to the safety
and soundness of its credit institutions, especially when universal banking becomes
internationalized and deregulated in the global market. 380 Whether or not universal banks
are adequately supervised has become an important issue in the EC since 1977. 381 Under
the First Banking Directive, the host country should "establish capital and solvency ratios
See generally, Lawrence L. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law, Strengthening International Banking
Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (1998).
Suzette Rodriguez, Are Banks within the European Community Adequately Supervised? 17 B.C. Int'l
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382
applicable to the banks to ensure prudential banking practices"." ^ Moreover, Member
States should cooperate to supervise credit institutions." Recognizing that some
problems could result from the supervisory regime under the First Banking Directive, the
Council adopted the Second Banking Directive, establishing the principle of home state
control." The responsibility of supervising banking activities remained in the home
state, where banks have their registered offices. The EU financial services regulatory
structure would be able to prevent potential financial crises to some extent. 38
Nevertheless, "host Member States shall retain responsibility in cooperation with the
competent authorities of the home Member State for the supervision of the liquidity of
the branches of credit institutions pending further coordination". 38 The 1983 Directive
on Consolidated Supervision required horizontally-structured credit institutions to
100
combine their financial status for supervising purposes. Moreover, the Council adopted
the 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision to require consolidated supervision of
TO A
vertically-structured groups. Instead of imposing obligations directly on credit
institutions, the 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision increases the responsibilities
of parent companies and supervising authorities. 390
The Council has also provided guidelines for adequate supervision to ensure the
safety and soundness of credit institutions.391 However, the Council can not accomplish
its goals to supervise international banks adequately without cooperation from the
Member States. In order to ensure that banking institutions are acting on a safe and sound
' Thomas F. Mcinerney III, Towards the Next Phase in International Banking Regulation, 7 DePaul Bus.
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363
Id.
384
Rodriguez, supra note 381, at 222.
385
Id. Also see Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC.
Barbara C. Matthews, The Second Banking Directive: Conflicts, Choices, and Long-term Goals, 2 Duke
J. Comp.&Int'l 89, 90(1992).
387 Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, Art. 14.
Rodriguez, supra note 381, at 222. See Also The 1983 Directive on Consolidated Supervision
Id. Also see The 1992 Directive on Consolidated Supervision
390
Id.
i9]
Id.
65
basis, it is necessary for the Member States to implement these Directives properly
through their supervisory authorities.
Although there are a lot of arguments on the appropriate regulatory model for
banking businesses, clearly adequate supervision is important to ensure the safety and
soundness of the banking system. Many developed countries have preserved prudential
supervisions, such as requirements for capital adequacy, adequate liquidity, and internal
control systems, etc.
393
As modern banking becomes more internationalized, effective
international supervision is increasingly important. Lessons from the BCCI scandal
suggest that financial crises might appear because of lacking supervision and control. 394
In addition, the failure of Barings PLC gives an example of how non-traditional systemic
risks can result and the consequence of inappropriate cross-border derivative
transactions.
39
' Although these bank collapses were not simply the result of banks'
extensive involvement in the securities business, they may underscore the importance of
domestic and international coordination of banking supervision. Expanded and
diversified banking business increases the need for effective cooperation of international
banking regulation. 396 While enlarging the international financial markets and quickening
the pace of liberalization of the financial industry, regulatory authorities have to ensure
the safety and soundness of domestic and international banking systems. The Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision and International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) have endeavored to achieve international regulatory convergence
TQO
on banking supervision. The overall purpose of the international supervision is to
protect the stability and integrity of banking system, thus ensuring the prosperity and
healthy development of international financial markets. The United States, European
392
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Union, and major developed countries have adopted the Basle Accords. This clearly
reflects a movement towards more coordinated financial supervisory standards in the
international financial system.
98
See Northon & Olive, supra note 15, at 228.
399
See Lee, supra not 380, at 30.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The financial modernization bills to overturn depression-era restrictions on bank
securities and other cross-industry activities were finally passed by the U.S. Congress,
and signed into law as the Gramm-Leach Act in November, 1999. The new legislation,
which took effective in March of 2000, places the final stamp of legitimacy on cross-
industry affiliations by banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. Financial
holding companies are able to offer a full range of financial services. As a result, more
cross-industry affiliations will take place, thus the number of financial conglomerates will
be increased. Subject to a liberalized regulatory regime, U.S. financial holding companies
will be able to effectively compete with foreign banks, such as European universal banks,
in both domestic and international marketplaces. In addition, bank customers will be able
to enjoy greater convenience and lower prices as the result of one-stop shopping within
one financial supermarket.
The scope of the future business of banking will be much broader than today,
considering the rapid development of new financial products and technology innovations.
Deregulation and removing restrictions on bank activities has become an inevitable
reality of expanded financial markets. However, protecting the safety and soundness is
also extremely necessary. The Financial Services Act of 1999 is, to a certain degree,
successful in reducing regulatory burdens on financial institutions, expanding banking
powers, and delegating supervisory responsibilities among financial regulators. But there
are some remaining issues, regarding the right corporate structure of financial
conglomerates, the appropriateness of a functional regulatory regime, and the proper
scope of consumer protection provisions. Resolving these issues would help to reduce
67
68
potential risks and abuses in the diversified and expanded financial market. In addition,
how to achieve necessary cooperation among various financial regulators is still of
concern. To effectively implement the new legislation, financial agencies should not
create excessive regulatory burdens, and at the same time should avoid potential
regulatory gaps in the rapid-changing financial businesses.
The growth of financial transactions in the international market also raises some
problems. Inadequate supervision and control on international banks could result in
potential financial crises. Therefore, cooperation between national financial supervisory
authorities is increasingly necessary to prevent possible bank failures and financial
disasters in the international banking system. Since many financial services are highly
interchangeable in the modern market, it is difficult to distinguish traditional banking and
investment banking businesses. Accordingly, there is a need for cooperation between
banking agencies and other financial agencies such as securities regulators. On the
international level, for example, the Basle Accords are intended to regulate other
financial industries beside banking by cooperation with the International Organization of
Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.400
Although diversified operations by banks both in domestic and international
markets do not materially increase the prospects of a financial crisis, safety and
soundness concerns remain legitimate. Effective coordination of international supervision
is highly important, because of the increased complexity of the structure of the
international banking industry. While allowing banks to engage in the full range of
financial businesses, including commercial banking and investment banking businesses,
domestic regulators and international supervisors should cooperate to maintain the safety
and soundness of financial system. When trying to enhance the efficiency, profitability
and competitiveness of future banking industry, regulatory authorities should ensure that
400
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banking organizations are adequately supervised, both in domestic financial markets and
international markets.
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